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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Investment Motive Precludes Ordinary Loss
Treatment
In a recent Tax Court decision the IRS won the case but may
have lost the war. The case departed from prior decisions by
recognizing a possible dual purpose in a business investment. Yet
by finding that any substantial investment motive will preclude
ordinary loss treatment under the Corn Products doctrine, the
court may have created a boon to taxpayers in similar gain
situations.
Petitioner corporation, a raw wool processor and seller, organ-
ized a subsidiary' to manufacture woolen cloth. Petitioner's primary
motive for creating the subsidiary was to have a "captive" customer
for its processed wool.2 However, the petitioner also expected that
the subsidiary would return a profit.' The subsidiary was operated
for 9 years, and suffered a loss in all but 2 of those years.' At the
end of this period the subsidiary was liquidated, leaving no assets
after all its debts were paid. Petitioner took an ordinary loss deduc-
tion on the stock. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue deter-
mined a deficiency in petitioner's federal income tax, contending
that the losses on the stock should be treated as capital rather than
ordinary losses. On petition, the United States Tax Court held:
The existence of a substantial investment motive precludes the
application of the doctrine5 of Corn Products Refining Co. v.
1. Petitioner owned 72 percent of the stock of the subsidiary.
2. The court found that the wool industry had generally encountered economic difficul-
ties during the 1950's and 1960's. Specifically, between 1956 and 1961, the petitioner's sales
had dropped from $9.5 million to $3 million. W.W. Windle, 65 T.C. No. 62, P-H TAX CT. REP.
& MEM. DEC. 1 65.62 at 391 n.1 (Jan. 7, 1976). The petitioner decided to organize the
subsidiary when one of its better customers went out of business. The petitioner bought the
equipment of the prior customer for use by the subsidiary. Id. at 392.
3. Prior to purchasing the stock in the subsidiary petitioner investigated the profitability
of a wool mill in that area. Studies were conducted. and forecasts made on expected sales,
material requirements, expenses, and profit for the next 2 years. The results of these studies
indicated that the subsidiary would make a profit. Id.
4. Petitioner continued to operate the subsidiary even after it became obvious that it
would never return a profit because the petitioner wanted to preserve its captive customer.
The petitioner fulfilled about 99 percent of the subsidiary's material requirements and knew
that as long as the subsidiary continued to operate petitioner would be able to make profitable
sales to it, even if the subsidiary was not profitable. The court found that the petitioner
received profits of between 8.4 percent and 20.7 percent on all its sales to the subsidiary, even
in those years when the subsidiary was losing money. Id. at 393.
5. See text accompanying notes 12-13, infra. The doctrine basically holds that gain or
loss from the sale of property traditionally considered a capital asset will be treated as
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Commissioner,' and the stock loss must be treated as capital loss
rather than ordinary loss. W. W. Windle, 65 T.C. No. 62, P-H TAX
CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 65.62 (Jan. 7, 1976).
Section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code' defines "capital
asset" as all property held by the taxpayer except those assets spe-
cifically excluded under its provisions.' The classification of prop-
erty as a "capital asset" is important because, with one important
exception,' a taxpayer will not realize a capital gain or loss unless
the asset sold or exchanged falls within the classification. Since
capital gains and losses are treated differently from ordinary gains
and losses,'I it is important in many situations to ascertain whether
the asset sold or exchanged is a capital asset. If the sale or exchange
results in a gain, the taxpayer will try to classify it as a capital gain,
ordinary gain or loss if the property was purchased in connection with the taxpayer's business.
6. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
7. Unless otherwise specified, all references to the Internal Revenue Code are to the 1954
code.
8. The types of property excluded are:
a. stock in or other inventory property;
b. property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business;
c. depreciable property used in trade or business;
d. real property used in trade or business;
e. accounts and notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or
business for services rendered or from the sale of stock in trade, inventory, or
property held for sale to customers;
f. copyrights, literary, musical, or artistic compositions, letters or memo-
randums, or similar property held by:
i. a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property or
ii. a taxpayer for whom such property was prepared or produced or
iii. a taxpayer whose basis in the property for purposes of determining
gain from sale or exchange, is determined, in whole or in part, by refer-
ence to the basis of the property in the hands of one of the first two
taxpayers mentioned in a and b;
g. federal or state obligations issued on a discount basis and payable with-
out interest, at a fixed maturity date not exceeding 1 year from the date of issue.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
9. Under section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code, gains or losses arising from:
a. the sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of real property and depre-
ciable personal property used in a trade or business and held for more than 6
months; and
b. the involuntary conversion of capital assets whether personal or held for
income producing purposes held for more than 6 months.
These section 1231 assets will be grouped together. If the grouping produces a net gain,
each gain or loss is classified as a capital gain or loss. If the grouping produces a net loss,
each gain or loss is ordinary income or loss.
10. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-02, 1211-12.
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while if a loss results, it is to the taxpayer's advantage to seek an
ordinary loss.
Corporate stock has traditionally been held to fall within the
ambit of the definition of a "capital asset" since stock is not among
the specific exclusions of section 1221." Therefore, any sale of stock
(other than by a dealer) 2 will usually result in either a capital gain
or loss. However, in addition to the specific exclusions to the defini-
tion of "capital asset" imposed by Congress, the courts have added
certain limitations. These limitations have resulted from an effort
on the courts' part to concentrate on congressional intent. Instead
of providing a liberal interpretation to the definition of "capital
asset," they have tried to determine whether the property in ques-
tion was the type of property Congress sought to classify as a "capi-
tal asset."
One of the more significant limitations on the scope of "capital
asset" created by the courts is that a gain or loss arising from a sale
or exchange which is closely related to the taxpayer's business or
trade should not be treated as a capital gain or loss, regardless of
whether the property in question falls within one of the statutory
exceptions. 3 The leading case establishing this principle is Corn
Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner." The taxpayer in Corn
Products was a manufacturer of starch, syrup, and other corn de-
rived products. Due to a drought, the price of corn rose to a level at
which the taxpayer was unable to buy corn at a price which would
allow it to compete with cane and beet products. In order to circum-
vent this dilemma the taxpayer bought corn futures. Thus, when
delivery dates approached, Corn Products could take the corn it
needed and sell its excess futures. The taxpayer made a gain on the
sale of the futures and reported it as if the futures were capital
assets. In affirming both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court held that profits arising from the sale of the corn
futures were ordinary income and not capital gain. The Court recog-
nized that the corn futures did not literally come within any of the
11. See Note, Judicial Treatment of "Capital" Assets Acquired for Business: The New
Criterion, 65 YALE L. 401, 406 n.28 (1956).
12. A dealer in securities is one who is engaged in the purchase and resale of securities
for profit. Because the securities are held by him for sale to his customers, the profit or loss
which results is ordinary income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(1); see Frank v. Commis-
sioner, 321 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1963).
13. E. COLSON, CAPITAL. GAINS AND LOSSES 49 (1975).
14. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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specific statutory exceptions of the definition of capital asset in
section 117(a)" of the Internal Revenue Code. The Court concluded,
however, that ordinary asset treatment was warranted since Con-
gress intended profits and losses arising from the ordinary operation
of a business to be treated as ordinary income or loss, not capital
gain or loss.
Admittedly, petitioner's corn futures do not come within the lit-
eral language of the exclusions set out in that section. They were
not stock in trade, actual inventory, property held for sale to
customers or depreciable property used in a trade or business.
But the capital-asset provision of § 117 must not be so broadly
applied as to defeat rather than further the purpose of Congress
... . Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the
everyday operation of a business be considered as ordinary in-
come or loss rather than capital gain or loss."
Therefore, although corporate stock had traditionally been consid-
ered a capital asset, with the advent of the Corn Products doctrine,
ordinary gain and loss treatment was available. Taxpayers were
able to deduct as ordinary losses, sales of corporate stock if the stock
was acquired in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.
Subsequent to Corn Products, a myriad of cases arose in which the
taxpayer incurred losses on the sale of stock and tried to make full
use of the doctrine. When any connection existed between the stock
and the taxpayer's business an ordinary loss was sought.
15. Section 117(a) is the 1939 Code predecessor of section 1221.
16. 350 U.S. at 51-52.
17. Although the Corn Products doctrine was first established in a gain situation, it can
readily be applied to a transaction in which a loss is involved. In Commissioner v. Bagley &
Sewal Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955), the Second Circuit held, prior to Corn Products, that
ordinary loss treatment could be afforded a loss incurred on the sale of securities purchased
as a business requirement. The taxpayer had entered into a contract through another corpora-
tion which required him to perform services for the government of Finland. Finland required
the taxpayer to post government bonds as security for his performance. After the contract
had been completed, the taxpayer sold the bonds at a loss. The court, in allowing ordinary
loss treatment, likened the loss on the bonds to the cost of a surety bond which would have
been fully deductible. Id. at 946. Together with Corn Products, Bagley forms the basis for
the "Corn Products doctrine."
18. For cases where an ordinary loss was upheld see, e.g., John F. Grier Co. v. United
States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964) (restauranteur purchased stock in a corporation to acquire
the lease to land upon which he wished to operate a restaurant); Hagan v. United States,
221 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Ark. 1963) (taxpayer purchased stock in a corporation in order to
maintain the exclusive right to sell goods to it); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States,
303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (publisher purchased stock in a paper mill to insure a supply of
newsprint); Ancel Greene & Co., 38 T.C. 125 (1962) (taxpayer purchased stock of a mortgage
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In Windle the court found that there was dual purpose on the
part of the taxpayer when the stock was purchased. It ascertained
a legitimate business-related purpose for acquiring the stock. How-
ever, the court also determined that there was a nonbusiness invest-
ment purpose for the acquisition, which would require treatment of
the stock as a capital asset were it the sole motivation for the acquis-
ition. Traditionally, the courts have attempted to circumvent this
dual purpose problem, preferring to force the fact situation to fit
within a singular "business purpose" test,"5 while ignoring the real-
istic alternative that a dual purpose probably exists. Additionally,
the courts have applied any of four different formulas to the fact
pattern before them in order to determine whether the purpose be-
hind the purchase of the property falls within the singular "business
I
association as a prerequisite to the sale of a mortgage to the association); Mississquoi Corp.,
37 T.C. 791 (1962) (a paperboard manufacturer purchased debentures of a paper mill in order
to insure a supply of raw materials); Electrical Fittings Corp., 33 T.C. 1026 (1960) (electrical
parts manufacturer purchased stock in a foundry to insure a supoly of needed castings).
Contra, Duffy v. Lethert, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9442 (D. Minn. 1963) (paper producer pur-
chased stock in a publishing company in order to guarantee a buyer. The loss on the stock
sale was held not to be ordinary loss).
19. See Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869
(1970); Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 869 (1970). In Steadman, the taxpayer had been retained as a corporation's attorney.
Subsequent to the formation of the corporation, a need for additional funds arose and one of
the corporation's creditors offered to purchase the stock. This stock purchase would have
given the creditor control over the corporation and as a result his law firm would assume the
corporation's legal matters. In order to prevent usurpation of his position, the taxpayer
purchased a large number of the shares himself. Despite the influx of additional capital, the
corporation was unable to solve its financial difficulties and went bankrupt. Both the Tax
Court and Sixth Circuit allowed ordinary loss treatment, finding a purely business motive
behind the purchase. Charles W. Steadman, 50 T.C. 369 (1968), afl'd, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970). One Tax Court judge dissented, having difficulty with
finding that Steadman lacked any investment purpose. 50 T.C. at 383-84 (dissenting opin-
ion).
In Waterman the taxpayer was a seller of yarn who had purchased stock in a wool mill
which supplied him with his inventory. The purpose behind the stock purchase was to enable
the taxpayer to become the exclusive sales agent for the corporation. The agency proved to
be a failure and upon its termination the taxpayer sold the stock at a loss. The court found
that an ordinary loss deduction was justified based on its finding of a business rather than
an investment motive behind the acquisition. 419 F.2d at 854-55. The dissent doubted that
the facts supported this conclusion, citing the desire of the corporation that its exclusive agent
be an investor, as an indication of the taxpayer's motivation. 419 F.2d at 861 (dissenting
opinion).
These cases are examples of the potential difficulties and possible distortions which flow
from a strict "business purpose or nonbusiness purpose" category approach. Although the
decisions appear to reach the correct result, the facts of these cases strongly infer at least some




The fact that various courts have applied four different formu-
las"' in order to determine whether an apparent capital asset was
acquired with a sufficient "business purpose," and should therefore
be given ordinary gain or loss treatment, has generated substantial
unpredictability. These formulas'are: (1) the substitute for
deductible expense formula; (2) the underlying asset formula; (3)
the benefit to business formula; and (4) the integral part of the
corporate business formula.
The first and most restrictive of these formulas is also the one
adopted by the Internal Revenue Service. 2' An asset will produce
ordinary gain or loss only where the taxpayer's motive for the ac-
quisition of the asset is one which would qualify the cost of the item
as a deductible expense. The most typical example of this situation
has been where the taxpayer acquired stock in a corporation in order
to assure himself a supply of a product needed for his trade or
business.22 The courts view the stock acquisition as necessary if the
taxpayer is to continue generating ordinary income in his business.
The Internal Revenue Service adopted this position in Revenue
Ruling 58-40:3
Stocks, bonds or other securities, which are purchased pursuant
to a contract performed in the regular course of business or are
purchased solely for the purpose of obtaining inventory, under
certain circumstances, do not constitute capital assets. Gain or
loss resulting from the sale of such stocks, bonds or other securi-
ties constitutes ordinary gain or loss in some cases and, in other
cases, is to be reflected in the cost of the goods acquired for the
year in which the gain is realized or the loss sustained.
20. For a more complete discussion of these formulas see Javaras, Corporate Capital
Gains and Losses-The Corn Products Doctrine, 52 TAXES 770, 772-92 (1974).
21. See note 23 infra.
22. See, e.g., Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1958)
(department store purchased stock in a dress manufacturer in order to retain the dress line);
F.S. Services, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (marketer of petroleum
products acquired stock in a petroleum refinery in order to acquire supplies); Booth Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (publisher purchased stock in a paper
mill to insure a supply of newsprint); Western Wine & Liquor Co., 18 T.C. 1090 (1952)
(wholesale liquor dealer bought stock in a distilling corporation in order to acquire inventory);
Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146 (1946) (plywood wholesaler purchased deben-
tures of newly formed plywood manufacturer to insure inventory). Contra, Gulftex Drug Co.,
29 T.C. 118 (1957) (taxpayer bought stock in a distilling corporation in order to acquire
inventory, but continued to hold stock for 8 years after the whiskey inventory was secured).
23. 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 275.
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A second formula that has been used by the courts, and one
which is somewhat less restrictive than the "substitute for a deduct-
ible expense" formula, is to look at the "underlying asset." Under
this formula, an asset will not be treated as capital where the tax-
payer's purpose in acquiring the property was really to acquire an
underlying asset which would clearly produce ordinary income or
loss upon its sale.
The principal case representing this position is John F. Grier
Co. v. United States.24 In Grier, the taxpayer corporation, which
operated restaurants, had negotiated for the purchase of a particu-
lar club. Subsequently, the taxpayer learned that the premises were
in the possession of a corporate lessee, and the lessor would not
consent to an assignment of the lease. Thus, rather than an assets
acquisition, as originally contemplated, the taxpayer purchased 100
percent of the stock of the lessee corporation.
In upholding the taxpayer's claim for ordinary loss treatment
when the stock was sold 3 years later, the Seventh Circuit found
that:
Corporate stock is not invariably classified as a capital asset. To
ascertain whether stock is bought and kept not for investment
purposes, but only as an incident to the conduct of the taxpayer's
business, all surrounding circumstances must be considered. The
substance, as distinguished from the form of the taxpayer's ac-
tions determines whether the sale of the stock results in ordinary
gain or loss . ...
The . . . stock had value to someone who wished to operate
the Club. [The taxpayer] bought the stock and retained it only
to secure the assets as an incident to the conduct of its restaurant
business and not for investment. 5
Grier thus supports the proposition that stock will be considered an
ordinary asset when the stock is acquired by a taxpayer to gain
actual use and control of the stock's underlying assets and those
underlying assets are of a kind which would receive ordinary gain
or loss treatment upon their disposition, given the nature of the
taxpayer's business and the nature of the underlying assets.
The third formula, adopted by some courts, is to find that an
asset traditionally considered a capital asset will receive ordinary
24. 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964).
25. Id. at 165.
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gain or loss treatment where the purpose for its acquisition was to
"benefit the taxpayer's business." The typical situation to which
this formula is applied is the "captive market" stock purchase," as
exemplified by the facts of Windle. In this type of situation, the
taxpayer purchases stock in another company to create what could
be termed a requirements contract for the taxpayer's product. Thus,
since the taxpayer is trying to benefit his business, the courts using
this approach are looking to the business nature of the source of the
gain or loss.
The last and most liberal formula is to find an ordinary gain or
loss on a stock sale of a subsidiary where a corporate taxpayer can
prove that the subsidiary is an integral part of the corporate busi-
ness even though there is no direct benefit to the taxpayer corpora-
tion. 7 The rationale is that a corporate parent should be able to
26. See, e.g., Hagan v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Ark. 1963) (taxpayer
purchased stock in corporation in order to maintain the exclusive right to sell goods to it);
Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
869 (1970) (see discussion of case, note 19 supra); Weather-Seal, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
471 (1963) (manufacturer of storm doors incorporated its regional distributors to give stock
as an incentive to the branch manager. It repurchased stock of unsuccessful outlets at a loss).
27. See Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1971).
In Schlumberger the taxpayer was a manufacturer of electronic mineral exploration and
measuring equipment. It purchased two companies to aid in its business, a computer manu-
facturer and a military electronic systems developer. The Fifth Circuit found an ordinary loss
on the sale of the stock by finding that the acquisitions were designed to further the taxpayer's
business. Even though the businesses of the subsidiaries were not related to the taxpayer's
primary business, they found a business purpose in the desire to improve volume.
In addition, the court dismissed two of the IRS's traditional arguments against ordinary
loss treatment. The IRS had argued that ordinary loss treatment should be limited to cases
where the transaction was a "temporary business expedient." Id. at 1121. In addition, the
court rejected the IRS's contention that ordinary loss treatment should be reserved for a
acquisition made to protect an existing business rather than to expand the business. Id.
It would appear that the Schlumberger court believed that the Corn Products doctrine
was meant to cover any acquisition made for a business purpose. Accord, Midland
Distributors, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1973) (ordinary loss treatment
denied on liquidation of subsidiaries because there was no business need for their acquisition);
Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (In Dearborn a furniture manu-
facturer and distributor bought stock in a lumber manufacturer in order to guarantee a
supply. The court denied ordinary loss treatment on the sale of stock based on a finding that
since only 10 percent of the lumber sales went to the taxpayer, there was a substantial
investment motive not related to the taxpayer's business); Chemplast, Inc. 60 T.C. 623
(1973), aff'd, 35 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-461 (3d Cir. 1974) (ordinary loss deduction allowed
taxpayer corporation for unrecovered advances to its subsidiary formed to acquire its services
since advances were integrally related to taxpayer's business); Pittsburgh Reflector Co., 27
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 377 (1968) (ordinary loss allowed where taxpayer, a lighting fixture
manufacturer, sold stock it had acquired in a Canadian corporation which assembled and
distributed the taxpayer's products).
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obtain an ordinary loss treatment on the disposition of stock of a
subsidiary if it can be established that the subsidiary was acquired
or created in order to conduct a portion of the parent's business even
though the parent will not receive any direct benefit.
An examination of these four formulas indicates the difficulty
facing the courts and taxpayers in establishing the proper status to
be given the property in question. These four approaches demon-
strate that the courts have uniformly taken the position that it must
be first ascertained whether the asset was acquired primarily for a
"business purpose," in which case it would be treated as an ordinary
asset, or for an investment purpose, which would result in capital
gains or loss treatment. The confusion has resulted from the use of
different formulas by different courts to determine whether a busi-
ness or investment purpose exists. Windle is significant in that,
unlike these varied decisions, it recognizes the possibility of a dual
purpose and obviates the necessity for various formulas to unnatu-
rally force a fact pattern within a rigid and singular business pur-
pose test.
In contrast to the judicial confusion found in the stock purchase
area, it is interesting to note the position taken by the courts when
dealing with bad debt deductions. Section 166 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code allows an ordinary loss deduction for bad debts incurred
in the taxpayer's trade or business."8 The situation is analogous to
28. Section 166 provides in part:
(a) General Rule-
(1) Wholly worthless debts-There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt
which becomes worthless within the taxable year.
(2) Partially worthless debts-When satisfied that a debt is recoverable only in
part, the Secretary or his delegate may allow such debt, in an amount not in
excess of the part charged off within the taxable year, as a deduction.
(b) Amount of Deduction-For purposes of subsection (a), the basis for determining the
amount of the deduction for any bad debt shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 1011
for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of property.
(c) Reserve for Bad Debts-In lieu of any deduction under subsection (a), there shall
be allowed (in the discretion of the Secretary or his delegate) a deduction for a reasonable
addition to a reserve for bad debts.
(d) Nonbusiness Debts-
(1) General rule-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation-
(A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any nonbusiness debt; and
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the taxable year, the
loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or exchange,
during the taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more than 6 months.
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined-For purpose of paragraph (1), the term "nonbu-
siness debt" means a debt other than (A) a debt created or acquired (as the case
[Vol. 30:760
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the stock purchase problem, in that the court must determine
whether the loan was made for a business purpose or an investment
purpose.
United States v. Generes 9 is the leading case which specifically
addresses itself to the test for allowing a bad debt deduction. In
Generes the taxpayer indemnified a surety of a corporation in which
he was a 44 percent stockholder and employee. The corporation
went into receivership and Generes took the loss as an ordinary loss.
Generes claimed that his sole motive for signing the indemnification
agreement was to protect his job. In rejecting this claim, the Court
adopted a test which required a threshold determination that the
business purpose be the "dominant and primary motivation" be-
hind the loan before it can be afforded ordinary loss treatment. The
Court concluded thatGeneres lacked such motivation and his real
purpose was to protect his investment in the corporation.
The similarities between the stock purchase and the bad debt
situations raise a forceful argument for the application of the same
test to both. In each situation, the taxpayer channels money into a
company in which he has both a business purpose and an invest-
ment interest. In each, the determining factor is the weight given
by the court to the business purpose vis-a-vis the investment inter-
est underlying the transaction. The ultimate outcome of both trans-
actions is the same in that the taxpayer provides funds for the use
of the corporation, which in turn, increases his financial interest in
that company. Based on these similarities, it is submitted that to
apply different tests (i.e., the "business purpose" test which is con-
cerned only with the finding of a business purpose as opposed to the
"primary motivation" test which recognizes the possibility of more
than one purpose) to a transaction depending on whether it takes
the form of a stock purchase or a loan is not sound.
In Windle the court departed from the "business purpose" test
which had been applied in prior cases. Rather than trying to ascer-
tain the presence or absence of a business purpose, the court took a
more realistic position and recognized the presence of a dual motive.
On the basis of the entire record we have found that petitioner's
predominant motive in acquiring [the subsidiary] stock was to
may be) in connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer; or (B) a debt,
the loss from the worthlessness of which, is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or
business.
29. 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
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acquire a captive customer, and that its secondary reason was to
make an investment in a business it expected to succeed and
grow.'"
The finding of a secondary investment motive was based on the
fact that the taxpayer first had undertaken study to determine the
projected profits of the subsidiary prior to the acquisition. The court
acknowledged that the investment could only have been a secondary
motivation since the taxpayer held on to the subsidiary for a period
of 9 years in which the subsidiary lost money in all but 2.
The Internal Revenue Service argued that if the taxpayer had
any investment motive at all, even a secondary one, that motive
would taint the business nature of the transaction and thus the
property must be deemed a capital asset.3
In examining the prior law, the tax court easily distinguished
two of the three cases relied on by the IRS - Midland Distributors,
Inc. v. United States32 and Duffy v. Lethert'3 - by finding that in
both cases the predominant, if not sole purpose for the stock
acquisition, was an investment motive. However, the third case
raised by the IRS, Dearborn Co. v. United States,34 was found to be
persuasive because investment was not the sole motivation. The
Tax Court found that Dearborn stood for the proposition that:
[Blecause the parent was motivated by a substantial invest-
ment motive, the stock acquired was a capital asset in the tax-
payer's hands, even though the principal reason for acquiring the
stock was to acquire the company's supply and production facili-
ties, a business purpose."
While discussing the confusion in the area, the Windle court
referred to two Court of Claims cases which had been decided on the
same day. In Agway, Inc. v. United States,3" the court refused to
apply the Corn Products doctrine. The taxpayer in Agway had pur-
chased stock in order to obtain a source of supply, but the court
found that there was also an investment motive. Relying on
30. P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 65.62 at 398.
31. Id. at 400.
32. 481 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9442 (D. Minn. 1963).
34. 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. C1. 1971) (see discussion of this case at note 27 supra).
35. P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 65.62 at 400, citing Dearborn Co. v. United States,
444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
36. 524 F.2d 1194 (Ct. C1. 1975).
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Dearborn, Agway held "that Corn Products will be applied in this
court to purchases of company stock to obtain a source of supply,
only if there is no substantial investment intent." 7
In contrast to its holding in Agway, the Court of Claims in
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States,38 found that where the
parent railroad corporation held stock in a subsidiary railroad cor-
poration, the stock would not be given capital asset treatment. The
court implied, rather, that some investment motive, so long as it
was not primary, would enable the taxpayer to meet the business
purpose test, and thus allow ordinary gain or loss treatment. :"
The Windle court indicated that the Court of Claims position
was equivocal as a result of its inconsistent positions in Agway and
Union Pacific. It further concluded that its own precedents were not
controlling since no decision had directly faced or decided the
mixed-motive situation found in Windle. Thereupon, the Tax Court
determined that stock purchased with any substantial investment
purpose is a capital asset even if there is a more substantial business
motive. The court gave two reasons for its decision.
First, it felt that by expanding the existing Corn Products doc-
trine so as to include mixed-motive cases, the area of uncertainty
would increase and thus taxpayers would be presented with greater
opportunity to claim ordinary losses on unsuccessful investments.
Second, in what appears to be a reaction to the ever increasing
expansion of Corn Products, the court held that "there must be
limits to the liberties we can take with the statutory language of
section 1221."''
In determining what constitutes a "substantial" investment
motive the court adopted the three-pronged test found in Dearborn:
(1) no premium over fair market value was paid for the stock; (2)
the investment was permanent rather than temporary; and (3) an
investment profit was anticipated.
Despite the enunciation of this three-pronged test, the court
apparently relied most heavily on the anticipated profit factor. It is
suggested here that the findings of fact by the court, while called a
"substantial investment motive" were, in terms of commercial real-
ity, nothing more than a "secondary investment motive." The mere
37. Id. at 1201 (emphasis added).
38. 524 F.2d 1343 (Ct. C1. 1975).
39. Id. at 1359.
40. P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 65.62 at 402.
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LA W REVIEW
taking of precautionary profit studies can hardly be termed a "sub-
stantial" investment motive in light of business realities. In addi-
tion, the fact that the taxpayer held on to the subsidiary for 9
predominately nonprofit years certainly warrants against a finding
of a "substantial" investment motive. It is further contended that
an "investment motive," no matter how it is characterized, can be
found in virtually every stock acquisition. The Tax Court by recog-
nizing the dual motive possibility behind the stock purchase in
Windle, made a rational step towards recognition of business real-
ity. However, the "substantial investment purpose" test of Windle,
adopted apparently as a result of the ever increasing expansion of
Corn Products under the confused "business purpose" test, is un-
realistic. It will not permit an ordinary loss deduction in those cases
in which the stock purchase is for a legitimate business motive.
Certainly, it is reasonable to expect that a stock purchase may be
made as a result of a business need, yet still offer a substantial
investment opportunity. It is submittedi that under this "substan-
tial investment motive" test the Windle court was forced to distort
the facts of the case in order to reach its desired result and yet avoid
conflict with the Corn Products doctrine.
Logic dictates that a more reasonable approach to take would
be to adopt the "primary purpose test" used in Generes. That is,
the predomiant motive behind the acquisition of the stock should
be the determining factor in ascertaining the status of the asset.
Thus, if there is a primary business motive, the presence of a sec-
ondary investment motive should not result in the disallowance of
ordinary loss treatment. The adoption of such a test would produce
results which allow an ordinary loss deduction when the asset is
purchased due to a primary business motivation. It would, never-
theless, still limit the deduction to a capital loss when it cannot be
established that the purchase provides no more than an incidental
benefit to the business of the taxpayer.
A significant sidelight to this case provides an ironic twist. At
approximately the same time that the IRS was presenting its briefs
in Windle, Revenue Ruling 75-1341 was issued. The question pre-
sented in the Revenue Ruling was whether an employee-stockholder
could receive ordinary loss treatment on stock that had become
worthless. In ruling against the taxpayer, the IRS followed Generes
41. 1975-2 CUM. BULL. 67.
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and held that "whether the sale or exchange of shares of stock gives
rise to ordinary as opposed to capital gain or loss depends upon
whether the taxpayer purchased and held the stock with a
predominant business motive as distinguished from a predominant
investment motive."4
Thus the IRS argued in Windle that the presence of any invest-
ment motive will destroy ordinary asset treatment while in the Rev-
enue Ruling the IRS contended that it is the predominant motive
which controls. The reaction of taxpayers is readily predictable.
Taxpayers seeking ordinary losses will go to the Court of Claims and
argue that their predominant motive was a business purpose under
the Revenue Ruling; taxpayers seeking capital gains will go to the
Tax Court and argue Windle, claiming that they had some
investment motive in the transaction.
Another ironic twist is that the IRS argued a position in Windle
which would make capital gains treatment seemingly easy to ob-
tain. It is difficult to conceive of a gain situation resulting from a
stock transaction where the taxpayer would be unable to establish
any investment motive.
The Windle decision has placed the IRS in an uncomfortable
corner. It is suggested that the IRS implore the taxpayer in Windle
to appeal the case so that the IRS can concede it.
RONALD B. RAVIKOFF
Accused's Silence During Custodial Interrogation
May Not Be Used to Impeach Credibility
Pursuant to Miranda, a defendant has a right to remain
silent during custodial interrogation. As a concomitant of that
right, a recent United States Supreme Court decision held that
a defendant's failure to offer exculpatory statements during
such an investigation may not be used in the subsequent trial
for the purpose of impeachment as a prior inconsistent state-
ment. The author criticizes the majority's failure to base its
decision on constitutional, rather than evidentiary grounds, as
this leaves the door open for future use of "silence" for other
purposes at trial.
42. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
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